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Abstract—Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) are a powerful method
to attack implementations of cryptographic algorithms. State-
of-the-art techniques such as template attacks and stochastic
models usually require a lot of manual preprocessing and feature
extraction by the attacker. Deep Learning (DL) methods have
been introduced to simplify SCAs and simultaneously lowering
the amount of required side-channel traces for a successful
attack. However, the general success of DL is largely driven by
their capability to classify images, a field in which they easily
outperform humans.
In this paper, we present a novel technique to interpret 1D
traces as 2D images. We show and compare several techniques to
transform power traces into images, and apply these on different
implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
By allowing the neural network to interpret the trace as an image,
we are able to significantly reduce the number of required attack
traces for a correct key guess. We also demonstrate that the attack
efficiency can be improved by using multiple 2D images in the
depth channel as an input. Furthermore, by applying image-
based data augmentation, we show how the number of profiling
traces is reduced by a factor of 50 while simultaneously enhancing
the attack performance. This is a crucial improvement, as the
amount of traces that can be recorded by an attacker is often
very limited in real-life applications.
Index Terms—Side-channel attacks (SCAs), Deep Learning
(DL), AES, Convolutional Neural Network (CNNs).
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) by Kocher
et al. in 1996 [1], the topic has become a serious threat for
security devices and is extensively investigated in research
and industry. SCAs take advantage of information leakages
through timing, power consumption or Electromagnetic (EM)
emanations to extract secret parameters from cryptographic
algorithms implemented in software or hardware. Numerous
attack methods have been proposed in literature to analyze
side-channel leakages. These can be divided into two major
categories: Non-profiled and profiled SCAs. Techniques such
as Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [2] or Mutual Infor-
mation Analysis (MIA) [3] belong to the non-profiled class
and aim to recover cryptographic keys by using statistical
calculations between real power measurements and a hypoth-
esis of the leakage behaviour of the device under attack. In
profiled SCAs, the adversary performs an additional profiling
step with an open copy of the target device ahead of the actual
attack using Gaussian templates [4], stochastic attacks [5], or
machine learning methods [6].
Another path of work dealing with Deep Learning (DL)-
based profiled side-channel analysis has been introduced by
Maghrebi et al. in 2016 [7]. Several publications showed that
especially Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are able to
outperform classic key recovery techniques (see, e.g., [8] [9]
[10] for an incomplete list). CNNs are special types of DL
models that were originally proposed for image recognition
tasks [11]. They exploit local connection patterns in the
input data through receptive fields and weight sharing, and
are - to some degree - shift, scale, and distortion invariant.
State-of-the-art CNN architectures for image classification like
VGG have been winning the ImageNet Large Scale Visual
Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) since 2012, partly showing
above human-level performance. In the context of SCAs,
CNNs were mainly applied on the raw, one-dimensional side-
channel traces. However, there are several ways to transform
1D data structures (like side-channel traces) to 2D images
in order to enable visual learning techniques to recognize
patterns in time series data. Hatami et al., e.g., proposed
Recurrence Plots (RPs) to transform time series into 2D texture
images [12]. Audio or sound classification can be performed
with spectrograms in order to identify features in the time-
frequency domain [13]. Wang and Oates introduced Gramian
Angular Fields (GAFs) and Markov Transition Fields (MTFs)
to encode time series as images and achieved state-of-the art
results on 20 different data sets [14].
Motivated by the success of CNNs in computer vision,
this paper investigates the performance of profiled SCAs in
2D space. We encode power traces from four different data
sets as images using GAF, MTF, RPs and spectrograms,
and apply them to a 2D CNN in order to extract secret
key bytes from cryptographic implementations. While there
are notable differences between the methods, our experiments
show that 2D-based attacks can be more powerful than their
equivalents in 1D space. This holds also in case the traces
are preprocessed with state-of-the-art 1D transformations such
as Singular Spectrum Analysis (SSA) [15]. We furthermore
demonstrate how the performance of the CNN is further
enhanced by combining different 2D representations of a trace
into a single image as illustrated in Fig. 1. Finally, we explore
image-based data augmentation to boost the robustness of
our CNN model and report valid parameter settings for all
transformation techniques.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows: In
Section II, we give an overview about related work. In Section
III, we shortly recap profiled SCAs and introduce 2D CNNs.
In Section IV, we present several techniques to transform time
series to images and apply them to power traces. In Section
V, we evaluate our approach by attacking unprotected and
protected AES implementations. The last section summarizes
the paper and gives insights on possible future work.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been numerous tools and techniques proposed
in literature that deal with the preprocessing of side-channel
traces to increase the power of SCAs. They can be grouped
in the following categories:
A. Denoising
Techniques to improve the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
range from simple trace averaging to advanced filtering using
Kalman and Wiener filters [16], or the forth-order cumulant to
remove Gaussian noise [17]. Noise reduction in the frequency
domain is also widely used in practice, e.g., wavelet-based
methods [18], Hilbert transform [19] and SSA [15]. Maghrebi
et al. recently proposed Independent Component Analysis, a
technique for blind source separation, to denoise side-channel
measurements and could show a significant SNR gain [20].
The methods investigated in this paper are not explicitly
designed to decrease the level of noise in time series, but can
be easily combined with them before the transformation in the
2D space is done.
B. Dimensionality Reduction and POI Selection
Identifying Points of Interest (POIs) or features in side-
channel traces has been traditionally studied in the context of
Template Attacks (TAs), in order to reduce the computational
overhead during calculation of the covariance matrices. In
particular, Difference of Means (DOM) [4], Sum Of Squared
pairwise T-differences (SOST), Sum Of Squared Differences
(SOSD) [21], and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [22]
have been proposed for that purpose. Another common strat-
egy for POIs selection and dimensionality reduction is based
on Pearson correlation, whereby the importance of sample
points is measured by the correlation coefficient of the actual
power consumption and some key-dependent target interme-
diate value [23].
C. Dataset Augmentation
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) usually require a large
amount of training data in order to learn effectively. Since
generating more data is often too expensive or not possible
at all, fake data can be created and added to the training
set which is referred to as dataset augmentation [24]. It has
been particularly effective in object recognition tasks, where
images are, e.g., flipped, rotated or cropped to boost the
performance of the classifier [25]. Cagli et al. investigated data
augmentation in the context of SCAs to defeat jitter-based
countermeasures by artificially distorting traces [8]. To this
end, shifting deformations (simulates random delay) and add-
remove deformations (simulates clock jitter) were applied to
the traces of different training sets. Pu et al. furthermore in-
troduced a lazy validation method to find an appropriate range
of which the traces can be shifted horizontally [26]. Recently,
Kim et al. proposed to add Gaussian noise to the input during
training in order to improve the attack performance [10]. In
this work, we apply several data augmentation techniques to
2D representations of side-channel traces and compare them
with the aforementioned methods from the 1D domain.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Profiled Side-Channel Attacks
Profiled attacks are considered as the most powerful type
of SCAs and are composed of two phases: a profiling (or
training) phase, and an attack phase (inference in machine
learning context). During the first phase, the attacker uses a
profiling device (which is similar to the target device and on
which input parameters as the secret key and plaintext can be
set arbitrarily) to build a very precise model of the physical
leakage. For that purpose, he acquires a set of SP side channel
traces x ∈ RN from the profiling device, where N denotes the
number of sample points in the measurements. Let y = g(p, k)
be a random variable representing the result of an intermediate
operation of the target cipher which depends partly on public
information p (plaintext or ciphertext chunk) and secret key
(byte) k ∈ K, where K is the set of possible key values. The
value of y is assumed to have an influence on the deterministic
part of the power or EM measurements. As a final step, the
adversary estimates the probability distribution:
Pr[x|Y = y] (1)
using the profiling set DProfiling = {(xi, yi)}SPi=1.
In the attack phase, a new set DAttack composed of SA
attack traces from the actual target device is acquired by the
adversary. The target device is structurally identical to the
profiling device whereby the secret key k is fixed but unknown.
In order to recover k, the adversary follows a maximum
likelihood strategy and estimates the posterior probability for
all possible key candidates k∗ using Bayes’ theorem:
d =
SA∏
i=1
Pr[Y = yi|xi] =
SA∏
i=i
Pr[x = xi|yi = g(pi, k∗)]
Pr[yi = g(pi, k∗)]
(2)
where the k-th entry in the score vector d corresponds to
the correct key candidate [27].
B. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)
CNNs incorporate dedicated knowledge about a specific
type of input into their architecture. They are designed to
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Fig. 1: Top-level overview of our approach. One-dimensional SCA traces are transformed into images, which are later used as
input for a 2D CNN. It is also possible to stack several pictures generated from the same trace like different channels in an
RGB image.
process data that has a grid like topology such as time-
series data or images. Such data usually has a strong local
structure meaning that variables (or pixels) that are spatially or
temporally nearby are highly correlated [11]. Unlike traditional
learning algorithms, CNNs are able to automatically extract
and combine local and global features. The main building
blocks for that purpose are the convolution and pooling layers
which are introduced in the following subsections. Afterwards,
we give a brief overview about the principal architecture
and training of CNNs. We refer the reader to [24] for a
comprehensive description of CNNs and DL in general.
1) Convolutional Layer: This type of layer is the core
building block of a CNN to exploit spatially local correlations.
To this end, a kernel or filter W of size r×r (sometimes called
receptive field) glides throughout the input F of size m ×m
and calculates an activation or feature map F˜ according to the
formula:
F˜(x, y) =
r∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
F(x+i, y+j)·W(i, j), 1 ≤ x, y ≤ m (3)
There are usually several kernels in a convolutional layer,
whereby every kernel creates a corresponding feature map
which are stacked together along the depth dimension. The
weight parameters of the kernels are learned to activate when
they detect a specific feature or pattern in the input.
2) Pooling Layer: The pooling layers are responsible to
reduce the resolution of the input in order to decrease the
number of parameters and the computational complexity of
the network. In most CNNs, this is done by the max-pooling
operation which considers only the maximum value within a
rectangular neighborhood. Apart from downsampling the data
stream, pooling helps the network to be invariant to small
translations of the input, i.e., the exact location of a structure
is not important but if the structure is present in the input at
all.
3) Architecture & Learning: Typical CNN constructions
consist of repetitive blocks of convolution and pooling lay-
ers. The basic concepts of sparse, local connectivity, weight
sharing and subsampling enable the network to extract more
abstract representations of given inputs. On top of the feature
extractor part, fully connected layers, which are composed
of neurons as in traditional neural networks, are responsible
for feature combination and finally classification of the input.
Non-linear activation functions, such as sigmoid or Rectified
Linear Unit (ReLU), ensure that the network is able to
approximate more complex dependencies. These are directly
connected to the output of convolutional or fully-connected
layers. The neurons in the last layer output class scores in
form of a probability distribution by means of the Softmax
function.
CNNs are usually trained in an iterative, multi-step pro-
cess by which the weights of the kernels and neurons are
optimized to minimize a dedicated loss function (i.e., the
categorical cross-entropy in a classification setting). The loss
depicts the difference between the expected output (i.e. labels)
and the prediction result produced by the last layer. For
faster convergence, gradient-based optimizer algorithms such
as Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) or ADAM are applied
in practice for updating the parameters of the model. An
important hyperparameter that controls the training process is
the learning rate, which determines how fast the weights of
the network are driven towards the optimal solution.
IV. SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS IN 2D
In this section we introduce our method to create 2D
representations of power traces. To that end, we investigate
different signal processing techniques and give suitable pa-
rameter settings. Afterwards, we compare the methods with
respect to the amount of leakage that can be detected in the
generated images.
A. Imaging Side-Channel Traces
In the following, we discuss four techniques to transform
a vector x = [x1, . . . , xN ] ∈ RN consisting of side-channel
measurements into a matrix X ∈ RM×N , where M and N
denote the height and width of the matrix. An overview of all
techniques is provided in Table I. The motivation to encode
SCA traces as images is to generate new and more discrimina-
tive features that are not directly present in the time domain.
This enables us to treat the problem of classifying power traces
in a profiled SCA as an image recognition task, which can be
effectively handled by 2D CNNs. It is furthermore possible
TABLE I: Overview of transformation techniques into 2D space
GAF MTF RP STFT
Encoded information Superposition/Difference
of temporal correlations
Transition probabilities
between quantiles
Phase space dynamics Frequency per time
Parameters [used value] PAA [false] Number of quantiles Q
[8]
Dimension of trajectories
M [1], delay τ [1],
threshold  [0],
binarization [false]
Window type [Hann],
window length 4t [8],
overlap [0.9·4t], sample
frequency FS
[1.25/2 · 109 Hz]
Image size (for trace of length N ) N ×N N ×N N ×N N × 5
to concatenate different 2D representations of a single power
trace into a multi-channel image to enhance the robustness and
performance of the classifier.
1) Gramian Angular Field (GAF): GAF exploits the tem-
poral correlation of the time series data to create images [14].
For that purpose, a time series trace x is rescaled to a range
of [−1, 1] using a Min-Max scaler:
x˜i =
xi −max(x) + (xi −min(x))
max(x)−min(x) (4)
Afterwards, the trace is transformed into the polar coordi-
nate system:{
φ = arccos(x˜i),−1 ≤ x˜i ≤ 1, x˜i ∈ x˜
r = tiN , ti ∈ N
(5)
The normalization of the trace in (4) and the arccos in (5)
result in a bijective mapping in the polar coordinate system.
The radius for the calculated value x˜i is determined through
its point in time ti in the trace. This is important, because
two different traces must not lead to the same image. Thus,
the temporal correlations for each measurement are preserved.
The last step is to calculate the Gram-Matrix G using the
transformed values:
G =

cos(φ1 + φ1) . . . cos(φ1 + φN )
cos(φ2 + φ1) . . . cos(φ2 + φN )
...
. . .
...
cos(φN + φ1) . . . cos(φN + φN )
 (6)
The usage of angles to create the Gram-Matrix leads to
a non-Gaussian distribution. This can be shown, when the
trigonometric sum, as defined in (6), is converted to the
Cartesian coordinate system:
cos(φ1 + φ2) = cos(arccos(x1) + arccos(x2))
= cos(arccos(x1)) · cos(arccos(x2))
− sin(arccos(x1)) · sin(arccos(x2))
= x1 · x2 +
√
1− x21 ·
√
1− x22
(7)
As shown in (7), a penalty term
√
1− x21·
√
1− x22 is added in
the Cartesian system. It reaches its maximum when x1 = x2 =
0. Another advantage of equation (6) is that the original time
series value can be reconstructed through the main diagonal
of the matrix.
The GAF comes in two different versions. On the one hand
as shown in equation (6), which is known as Gramian Angular
Summation Field (GASF) and on the other hand the Gramian
Angular Difference Field (GADF) which is defined as follows:
G =

sin(φ1 − φ1) . . . sin(φ1 − φN )
sin(φ2 − φ1) . . . sin(φ2 − φN )
...
. . .
...
sin(φN − φ1) . . . sin(φN − φN )
 (8)
In contrast to GASF, GADF uses the difference of the values
over the time t to calculate the temporal correlation. Moreover,
it is not possible to reconstruct the original trace through the
main diagonal since:
sin(φi − φi) = 0, i = 1 . . . N (9)
The advantage of the transformation to GAF images is that
the temporal dependencies are preserved through superposition
or differentiation. Additionally, there is no Gaussian distribu-
tion anymore which is important for CNNs to ease distinguish-
ing relevant data from noise. However, a disadvantage of those
transformations is the increased data overhead. A trace with
N sample points results in a N × N GAF image. In [14],
Piecewise Aggregate Approximation (PAA) has been used to
reduce the number of data points in time series. We have not
applied this step since the averaging induced by PAA would
lead to undesired information loss. Instead, we decided to use
only parts of the traces for the transformation (details will be
explained later in the paper). Examples of GAF images are
illustrated in Fig. 2b and Fig. 2c (first row).
2) Markov Transition Field (MTF): This is a another time
series imaging method introduced by Wang et al. [14]. In
order to apply it for SCAs, the power trace x is divided
into Q quantile bins. Every sample point of xi is assigned
to a bin qj(j ∈ [1, Q]), which segments the data over its
amplitude. Subsequently a Q×Q weighted adjacency matrix
W is created, by counting the transitions between the bins
over time using a first-order Markov chain. wi,j represents
the frequency by which a point in quantile qj is followed by a
point in quantile qi. Through the normalization
∑
j wij = 1,
the MTF is created. It has the disadvantage that information
about the temporal dependencies are lost. Hence, Wang et al.
had the idea to define the MTF as follows:
M =

wij|x1∈qi,x1∈qj . . . wij|x1∈qi,xN∈qj
wij|x2∈qi,x1∈qj . . . wij|x2∈qi,xN∈qj
...
. . .
...
wij|xN∈qi,x1∈qj . . . wij|xN∈qi,xN∈qj
 (10)
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Fig. 2: Images created from power trace the AES-Serial data set: (a) original trace segment, (b) GASF , (c) GADF, (d) MTF,
(e) RP, (f) spectrogram. The RP image and the spectrogram have been rescaled into a range between 0 and 1 manually after
the transformation. The corresponding correlation plots are shown in the second row.
The quantiles which contain the values xi and xj at the time
i and j are qi and qj (q ∈ [1, Q]). Thus, the MTF Mij
represents the transition probability qi → qj . As a result, the
MTF shows for each point of time in the trace the probability
of the transition from the quantile of the value xn ∈ qi to
the quantile of the value xm ∈ qj . Moreover, Mi,j||i−j|=l
represents the transition probability within the time interval l.
However, the main diagonal Mii is a special case which shows
the probability of a transition to the same quantile with l = 0.
As a last step, to increase the efficiency of computation and to
reduce the image size, an average filter with blurring kernel is
applied on non-overlapping rectangles. The result of a MTF
transformation is visualized in Fig. 2d.
A crucial parameter in the context of SCA is the number of
quantile bins Q used during the quantization. We investigated
different values in the range [5, N ]. Intuitively, a larger value
leads to a finer subdivision of the signal which seems to
be beneficial to capture small differences in the amplitude.
However, we got the best results using eight quantiles.
3) Recurrence Plots (RPs): RPs have already been intro-
duced by Eckmann et al. in 1987 [28]. The main idea is to
visualize the M-dimensional phase space trajectory of a non-
stationary time series signal as a two-dimensional representa-
tion of its recurrences. Informally spoking, an RP indicates at
which time instances the trajectory of the signal passes almost
the same area in the phase space. It can be mathematically
described as:
Ri,j = H(− ‖~xi − ~xj‖), ~x ∈ RT , i, j = 1 . . . NT (11)
where NT is the number of considered trajectories ~x, 
a threshold distance, ‖.‖ the (Euclidean) norm, and H the
Heaviside function. A single trajectory is defined by:
~xi = (xi, . . . , xi+(M−1)τ ), i = 1, . . . , N − (M − 1)τ (12)
where M is the dimension of the trajectories and τ is the
time gap between two back-to-back points of the trajectory. RP
constructs a symmetric matrix that relates the distance between
states as intensity values (i.e. the smaller the distance, the
higher the intensity in the image). Typical high-level patterns
that can be found in RPs are referred to as topology and can be
separated in the categories homogeneous, periodic, drift and
disrupted. Due to the oscillating signature of power traces,
RPs created from them contain large, recurrent structures as
shown in the example in Fig. 2e. We have used a phase space
dimension M = 1 and time delay τ = 1 throughout the
experiments in order to capture fine-granular phase change
information in the RPs. The choice of these parameter val-
ues is also supported by RP literature [29] and furthermore
simplifies the combination with other imaging techniques,
since the dimensionality of the resulting RP is the same as
for GASF/GADF. Additionally, we skipped the binarization
induced by the Heaviside function in equation (11) to avoid
information loss.
4) Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT): The Fourier
transform decomposes a signal into its frequency components.
This is shown by the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) in
equation (13), where x is the discrete and F (ω) the frequency
transformed signal.
F (ω) =
N−1∑
n=0
x[n]e−i
2piωn
N , ω = 0, . . . , N − 1 (13)
However, by transforming a signal into the frequency do-
main, time resolution is lost. Thus, it is known that a certain
frequency occurred but not when in time. This poses a problem
for SCAs, where it is beneficial to know within which time
a certain frequency occurs. Therefore, as shown in equation
(14), the STFT does not transform the whole signal at once.
Instead, a window function w[n − m] is used which slides
over the signal x[n]. Only the selected area of the window is
transformed into frequency domain using DFT. By doing so,
the frequencies within a time period of 4t are received.
STFT (m,ω) ≡ F (m,ω) =
∞∑
n=−∞
x[n]w[n−m]e−iωn (14)
The spectrogram is a visualization of STFT and plots the
intensity of the STFT magnitude over time.
STFT underlies the Ku¨pfmu¨ller’s uncertainty principle,
which describes a correlation between the resolution of the
time and the frequency domain. As a consequence, a high time
resolution leads to a blurry resolution in the frequency domain
and vice versa. That is because frequencies whose period
length is larger than the window size4t cannot be resolved. In
the context of SCAs, Yang et al. suggested to choose window
lengths in a range between 64 and 256 to obtain a reasonable
frequency resolution and balanced spectrogram image sizes
[30]. However, as we will demonstrate in the next section,
also smaller window sizes which lead to spectrograms having
the same time resolution than the original signal can give
promising results. They have just to be adjusted to the special
properties of CNNs. An example spectrogram using a window
length of 8 is shown in Fig. 2f.
B. Power Leakage Analysis in Images
In order to compare the amount of information that is
encoded by the different techniques, we have calculated the
Pearson correlation between the generated images and leakage
sensitive variable y. For that purpose, we first unrolled the
images along the height dimension into 1D arrays. Once
the correlation coefficient has been determined for individual
pixels, we constructed a 2D matrix of the same size as the
images.
The second row of Fig. 2 illustrates the result using 1000 im-
ages per technique. One can observe that equivalent structures
can be found in the images and corresponding correlations.
Bright areas in the correlation plots indicate locations with
higher leakage, and areas with low information content are
depicted in black. It can be seen that GASF, GADF and RP
images show leakage in similar regions in the upper left part,
while the leakage in MTF images is more distributed. The
leakage in spectrograms is most concentrated due to the small
frequency resolution. Another interesting point can be noticed
when comparing the highest amplitude of the correlation for
the 1D traces (Fig. 2a) with the maximum correlations that
can be found in the images. GADFs (≈ 0.38), RPs (≈ 0.42)
and spectrograms (≈ 0.38) seem to contain more information
than the original traces (≈ 0.33). However, MTF shows a
lower correlation maximum (≈ 0.26) . The leakage of GASF
images is on a similar level as in the traces. From that result,
we expect better results for at least some of the imaging
techniques compared to SCAs in 1D.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we investigate the performance of the
aforementioned transformation techniques in the context of
DL-based SCAs.
TABLE II: Network configuration of CNN
Layer Type Hyperparameters
Convolution 2D filters=8, kernel size=5x5, L2-reg=0.01
Batch Normalization -
Activation ReLU
Max-Pooling pool size=2x2, stride=2
Dropout rate=0.5
Convolution 2D filters=16, kernel size=3x3, L2-reg=0.01
Batch Normalization -
Activation ReLU
Max-Pooling pool size=2x2, stride=2
Dropout rate=0.5
Flatten -
Fully-Connected neurons=250, activation=ReLU
Batch Normalization -
Dropout rate=0.3
Fully-Connected neurons=256, activation=Softmax
A. CNN Architecture
The CNN architecture we have used throughout all ex-
periments is given in Table II. It consists of two blocks
each of which contains a convolution and max-pooling layer
followed by two fully-connected layers. Dropout layers and
L2-regularization are included for better generalization of the
model and help to reduce overfitting [24]. Additionally, batch
normalization is applied to establish a stable distribution of
activation values, which makes the network more robust to
parameter tuning. We have trained the CNN using the Adam
optimizer and a learning rate of 0.0002. In order to avoid
overfitting, the weights leading to the smallest validation
loss has been saved during training, and the process has
automatically been stopped once the validation loss has not
decreased for 20 consecutive epochs.
Our elaborated network configuration is inspired partly by
VGGNet [31] which showed remarkable performance in image
recognition. However, we are using fewer convolutional blocks
and the fully-connected layers are of smaller size since our
network only has to discriminate between 28 = 256 different
categories (classification of one byte) instead of 1000. We also
experimented with a pre-trained feature extractor (convolution
and pooling layers) of VGGNet, but got inconsistent results.
This is potentially because VGGNet has been trained with
real life objects, while our setup requires to classify time-
series images which are composed of completely different
structures and features. Please note that the goal of our paper
is not to describe an optimal network architecture but rather
to illustrates the advantages of SCA in 2D domain in general.
Nevertheless, our proposed CNN model is able to reach a high
performance on all data sets.
B. Data Sets
We consider four different data sets: an unprotected hard-
ware AES, an AES hardware implementation with random
jitter, a hardware AES setup with high noise, and a side-
channel protected software AES. The size of the profiling and
attack sets have been set to SP = 50 000 and SA = 10 000
examples for all data sets. We describe them briefly in the
following.
1) Unprotected Hardware AES: The power traces of this
data set originate from an unprotected hardware implemen-
tation of the AES running on a ZYNQ UltraScale+ FPGA.
The implementation contains a single S-Box instance, which
is why we refer to this data set as AES-Serial. It is commonly
known that the most leakage in a hardware implementation is
caused by register transitions [23]. Therefore, we have used
the XOR of two consecutive S-Box outputs in the first round
as target operation and consequently as labels for training. A
single measurement originally contains 1000 sample points,
but we have only used a segment of 80 data points from the
traces to generate the images (the location of these points was
roughly determined by correlation with known key). Please
note that the reduction has only been done in order to speed-up
the experiments, we expect similar results using the complete
traces.
2) Hardware AES with desynchronization: This data set is
similar to the former one except that the traces have been
artificially desynchronized. To this end, we have shifted each
trace to the right with a random offset in the range of [0, 50].
Such misalignments can occur due to an unstable measurement
setup or a jitter-based countermeasure (e.g. by creating an
unstable clock signal [32]). Since CNNs are, to some extent,
robust against variations in the input space as explained in
Section III-B, our goal is to evaluate the image-based SCA
approach under such conditions. We cut out segments of 180
sample points length from the traces for creating the images in
order to ensure that enough leakage information is available.
3) Hardware AES with high noise: Another range of ex-
periments are based on the public data set of the DPA Contest
v2 [33]. These side-channel traces were acquired from an
unprotected AES design running on an FPGA platform. The
used AES module performs one round per clock cycle. Each
trace contains 3253 sample points and covers a complete
encryption operation. We have pre-selected 500 sample points
for the experiments in order to attack the last round of the
encryption. Several studies noted that this data set is relatively
noisy and hard to attack [34].
4) Protected Software AES: The last data set we use for the
evaluation has been obtained from the public SCA database
ASCAD [27]. The targeted platform is a first-order secured
implementation of the AES running on an 8-bit ATMega8518
microcontroller. Each trace is composed of 700 sample points
and the targeted intermediate result is the third byte of the
masked S-Box output that is processed during the first round.
However, for training of the CNN, we only use the unmasked
result of the S-Box as labels to check whether the network
is able to learn an higher-order attack using the information
encoded in the images. For that purpose, the CNN has to
combine the leakages of the masks with the leakages of
the masked S-Box. Considering the SNR analysis given in
[27], those leakages occur roughly between the sample points
140−240 and 450−550. We therefore only used the respective
parts of the traces as input for the 2D transformations and
removed the remaining data points.
C. Methodology
After the traces have been encoded as images according to
Section IV, the CNN described in Table II has been trained to
solve the multi-class classification problem defined in Section
III-A. As evaluation metric, we have used the well-known
Key Guessing Entropy (KGE) or key rank function. The KGE
quantifies the difficulty to retrieve the correct value of the key
byte regarding the required number of attack traces [35]. It
is calculated by replacing the probabilities on the right-hand
side of equation (2) by its approximations retrieved from the
CNN, and a ranking of the score vector after the evaluation of
each attack trace. Intuitively, the faster the key rank converges
to one, the more powerful is the attack. In order to reduce the
statistical bias that is induced by the random initialization of
the CNN weights, we have trained the network from scratch
for ten times. During each run, we performed five independent
attacks using 2000 images/traces from DAttack. Finally, the
mean key rank over all ten runs has been calculated which is
similar to a ten-fold-cross validation evaluation as defined in
[27].
We have implemented our attack framework in Python using
the open-source DL framework Keras [36]. Training of the
CNN has been performed on a single Nvidia Tesla V100 GPU.
As a baseline, we also executed the attack using the raw trace
segments by replacing the 2D convolution and pooling opera-
tions in our CNN with their 1D equivalents. Additionally, we
compared our results to three different types of (unsupervised)
1D preprocessing techniques which are widely used in side-
channel analysis for comparison: SSA, Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT), and PCA using the 15 highest ranked components (this
choice of parameter gave the best results in our experiments).
D. Results for Single Image Attacks
Fig. 3 shows the results for the 1D baseline attacks in the
first row, and the single image-based attacks in the second row.
From there, one can observe the following:
1) GAF: The GAF methods show almost similar results
in the AES-Serial, AES-Desync and DPA-v2 data sets, while
GASF shows a considerably steeper key rank curve than
GADF for the protected software AES. We expected a larger
difference between the two GAF variants since GASF images
encode information about the original power trace in its main
diagonal which is not directly present in GADF images.
It seems that the temporal correlations contained in GAF
images alone provide enough features to recover the secret
key. Another notable point is the good performance on the
desynchronized data set. While the remaining transformation
techniques and also the 1D attacks need more traces to reach
a key rank of 1 compared to the aligned traces, GASF and
GADF show a better KGE. This can be explained by the
representation of the 1D signal in polar coordinates, which
helps to preserve absolute temporal relations. Additionally,
the spatial diversity of features in GAF images provide a
regularization factor that is known from data augmentation
methods. This improves the CNN model’s ability to generalize
distortions in the test set. We will exploit this aspect later in
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Fig. 3: Overview of attack results over the four data sets. The mean KGE for the 1D baseline (raw traces) along with the 1D
transformation methods are illustrated in the first row. The second row shows the mean key ranks for the single image attacks,
while the combined image attack results are illustrated in the third row.
the paper to further enhance the performance of GAF-based
attacks.
2) RP: The RP transform performs best in two out of the
four data sets among the image-based attacks, and is able to
consistently beat the 1D baseline. Except for the AES-Desync
data set, it furthermore performs similar or better than the best
1D preprocessing method SSA. This proves that recurrence
as defined in equation (11) is a suitable method to represent
variations in the power consumption, which can be exploited
effectively by a 2D CNN to distinguish between different
values of the attacked operation.
3) MTF: Looking at the result for MTF, one can see that it
has a significantly worse key rank than the other approaches
in all four data sets. One reason is the reduction of temporal
dependencies through the quantization step, which is required
for building the transition matrix. Another reason is that
the MTF transform produces a non-bijective mapping, i.e,
reconstructing the raw trace from an MTF image in an accurate
manner is - in contrast to GAF - hardly possible. However,
previous work showed that this property is an important factor
for classifying time series images. The observation that GAF
generally performs superior to MTF is thus in line with other
published results [14] and our correlation analysis shown
before.
4) STFT: The best performance on the AES-Serial data
set is achieved by the STFT-based attack. Although the
spectrograms only contain five frequency bands, the additional
information helps to reduce the amount of required attack
traces from 1000 to 500 in order to achieve a KGE of one
compared to the 1D baseline attacks. An improved KGE can
also be reported for the desynchronized AES traces and the
noisy DPA-v2 data set. However, the spectrogram-CNN fails
to attack the first-order secured implementation. We initially
assumed that a window length of eight in STFT may result in a
too small frequency resolution for the ASCAD data set, as the
traces have been sampled with a rate of 2 GS/s. However, we
got almost the same result when using larger STFT window
sizes (16, 64, 96, 128) following the guidelines of Yang et
al. [30]. We will later see that not the STFT parameters are
the reason for the bad performance, but the way how the
spectrogram is given to the CNN.
E. Results for Combined Image Attacks
The transformation techniques presented above encode
different types of information about time series data (like
power measurements): GASF/GADF show the superposi-
tion/difference of directions at two time steps, MTF images
encode transition probabilities from quantile to quantile, RPs
reveal space dynamics as distance between corresponding
trajectories, and spectrograms visualize the energy of a signal
as a function of frequency and time. Thus, we can consider
them as complementary representations of the same data
source which can be combined into a single image to improve
the classification performance of the CNN. The combination
has been done by concatenating images generated from the
corresponding power trace along the z-axis as shown in the
center of Fig. 1. Except for spectrograms, this was easily
possible since the images are of identical vertical and hori-
zontal resolution. To join spectrograms with other images, we
have upscaled the y-axis by dividing the five frequency bands
until the proper resolution has been reached (i.e. a rectangular
shape).
We have concentrated our evaluation on GASF-X combina-
tions due to the good performance of GASF on single image
attacks. The results are illustrated in the third row of Fig. 3.
From there, one can notice the following:
1) GASF-RP: This combination yields a small enhance-
ment of the KGE in the attack against the protected software
AES, likely because both techniques individually perform
well on this data set. The results on the other data sets are
comparable or even worse than single image RP attacks. This
indicates that RP and GASF features are too diverse for the
early data fusion approach that we have applied in this work.
The analysis of a combination of RP and GASF features in a
deeper CNN layer (i.e. late information fusion [37]) is subject
to future work.
2) GASF-STFT: The setup of rescaled spectrograms and
GASF images shows the best KGE in two out of four data
sets. The margin to the remaining methods is especially
large in the AES-Serial data, where a stable key rank of
one is reached with less than 100 attempts. This means an
improvement of a factor of ten compared to the 1D baseline
and single GASF, and a factor of five compared to unscaled
spectrograms. The performance increase for the ASCAD data
set is is also remarkable considering the worse result of
the spectrogram-only attack. We found that this mismatch is
mainly due to the frequency upscaling of spectrograms needed
for the image fusion. It improves the CNN kernel’s ability to
capture transitions between different frequency bands. While
in the unscaled spectrograms all frequency bands have been
processed together by the kernel in the first layer, in the
upscaled variant at most two frequency bands are evaluated in
parallel. This enables the kernels to create more discriminant
and informative features for deeper layers. Indeed we could
examine that the scaled spectrograms alone give a signifi-
cantly improved KGE compared to the unscaled version, and
also with regard to spectrograms having a higher frequency
resolution that were generated with a larger STFT window
parameter. However, similar to GASF-RP images, there seems
to be no improvement on the DPA-v2 data set. These findings
suggest that a concatenation of different image types is of less
benefit in case of highly noisy setups.
3) GASF-GADF: The combination of the GAF images
shows remarkable results for the AES-Desync and DPA-v2
data sets. This makes it very suitable for attacks on misaligned
and noisy traces. The combination is the only one which could
improve the KGE over all data sets compared to single image
attacks. furthermore, GASF-GADF is the only combination
TABLE III: Comparison of attacks for the ASCAD data set
Source KGE ≤ 2 Evaluation Method
[27] ≈ 450 10-fold-cross validation
[10] ≈ 500 Repeated random subsampling
[38] ≈ 700 10-fold-cross validation
[39] 338 Mean rank (mask values revealed)
This Paper ≈ 275 10-fold-cross validation
that is able to perform better than the 1D-based attacks in
all setups. The GAF transformations have different represen-
tations of temporal relations which rely on polar coordinates.
Therefore, it seems that the CNN is able to detect features
in the combined representations of temporal correlations to
enhance the classification accuracy for all attacked data sets.
In order to compare the results of the combined GASF-
GADF attack with other work, we show the KGE of related
approaches in Table III. We focus the comparison on the
ASCAD database since it represents a de-facto benchmark for
DL-based SCAs. Although the approaches are not completely
comparable due to changing evaluation setups, one can still
notice that the image combination attack requires significantly
less traces to approach a stable key rank smaller than two. This
further motivates the applicability of our approach despite the
timing overhead that is introduced through the transformation
of the traces into images (i.e. training time per epoch is roughly
doubled on our setup compared to the 1D attacks against
ASCAD).
F. Image-based Data Augmentation
Data augmentation can be seen as a way to artificially
increase the training set by showing the model many variations
of the same input data during training. It is an extensively
used technique in object classification due to the manifold
possibilities to apply geometric modifications to images. The
augmentation techniques do not change the label of an image,
hence allow the model to better generalize [24]. This section
aims to evaluate if 2D representations of power traces can
also benefit from image-based data augmentation, especially
in cases where the size of the profiling set is rather small.
For that purpose, we have restricted the number of training
data to SP = 1000, and applied the following five image
preprocessing techniques:
• Random rotation by up to 40 degrees, plus a shearing
operation with intensity 0.5
• Random horizontal and vertical shift by up to 20% of the
image size
• Erasing randomly picked rectangular patches (pixels are
set to random values between 0 and 1)
• Gaussian blurring
• Random addition of salt and pepper noise (i.e. individual
pixels are set to either zero or one)
The methods have been selected since they represent different
classes of augmentation types (geometric and arithmetic oper-
ations, segmentation, blurring). We have individually evaluated
the effect of each augmentation technique on all kinds of im-
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Fig. 4: Comparison of trace- and image-based data augmentation methods using SP = 1000 training examples: (a) 1D Trace,
(b) GASF, (c) RP, (d) Spectrogram. The red curves in the plots correspond to attacks without augmentation.
age transformations except MTF (due to the reasons discussed
earlier in the paper). Additionally, we have implemented
the random shift technique proposed in [8] and the noise
addition method of Kim et al. [10] to compare our results
with state-of-the-art 1D augmentation techniques. The results
are shown in Fig. 4. From there, it can be observed that
the augmentation methods perform differently on the imaging
types. For example, the geometric operations (rotation, shift-
ing) lead to good results when applied to GASF images, but
deteriorate the key rank of spectrogram-based attacks. This can
be explained by the usage of polar coordinates in GAF images.
Our spectrograms have a very low frequency resolution, thus
shifting or rotating introduces too much variance in the train-
ing set. Random erasing, on the other hand, gives a notable
performance boost in all attacks and seems to be a suitable
standard choice. It introduces an explicit form of regularization
by adding block noise, but maintains the global structure of
the image. This feature already showed good results on various
recognition tasks [40].
When comparing image-based augmentation with trace-
based augmentation, one can easily notice that image-based
augmentation is superior. While the 1D attacks only manage
a key rank between 15 and 20 using 2000 encryptions,
some of the GASF and RP-based attacks have a stable KGE
below two with only 700 traces. This means, by using image
augmentation, we achieved better results in the GASF and RP-
based attacks than in the experiments of Section V-D with only
1/50 of the training set. Another interesting point to notice is
the large gap between the curves without augmentation. The
imaging methods are still able to converge to a rank below
five, while the 1D attack reaches a key rank of around 60 after
2000 attempts. This is an unexpected result as the 2D CNN
has ten times the amount of trainable parameters compared to
the 1D version. Thus, the 2D model is much more prone to
overfitting in our restricted setting with only 1000 training
samples. However, the 2D attacks still outperform the 1D
attacks (even with trace augmentation). Overall, the results
of this section clearly confirm the effectiveness of DL-based
SCAs in two-dimensional space and the increased information
content of the generated images.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have examined several transformations
of 1D power traces into a 2D space in order to improve
the efficiency of DL-based SCAs. The performance has been
evaluated against advanced 1D representation techniques using
four different data sets. Among the considered methods, GAF
and RP have shown the best results in single image attacks.
Furthermore, we have compared different combinations of
images, which resulted in a further enhancement of the clas-
sification. The combination of GASF-STFT has shown a ten-
fold improvement on the AES-Serial implementation over the
1D baseline, and GASF-GADF has proven remarkable results
on both desynchronized and noisy AES traces. These two
combinations have demonstrated very robust results on all
data sets and outperform related approaches on the public
ASCAD database. Finally, we have investigated the impact of
data augmentation on the transformed traces, and were able to
observe the superiority of imaging methods over state-of-the-
art 1D attacks.
As a future work, we intend to evaluate other types of data
augmentation techniques, as well as a combination of different
techniques. Another interesting path could be to explore the
effect of image feature fusion in a deeper layer of the DNN,
instead of the image stacking approach we have applied in
this work. We expect these methods to further improve the
promising results of this paper.
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